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ABSTRACT 
 
Creativity is a multifaceted construct influenced by task constraints (Glucksberg & 
Wesiberg, 1966; Runco, 1986), cognitive processes (Bijvoet-van den Berg, & Hoicka, 2014; 
Claxton, Pannells, & Rhoads, 2005) and motivational factors (Dweck, 2006; Lucas & Nordgren, 
2015), and is hypothesized to have significant “slumps” where the development slows, such as 
the “fourth-grade slump” (Torrance, 1967; 1968). The purpose of the present study was to 
examine the hypothesized “fourth-grade slump” in creativity and determine whether cognitive 
factors, such as executive function (i.e., cognitive control, Zelazo, Muller, Frye & Marcovitch, 
2003), motivation factors (i.e., mindset and persistence), and situational factors (i.e., language 
used within a task) would interact with age to show different patterns of influence during 
different times of development. Although there was not a fourth-grade slump, we did find 
differences between children and adults where children had lower creativity but showed links to 
EF abilities in working memory. People at all age groups undervalued their persistence in a 
creative task and mindset was not related to creative ability. Taken together, these results 
indicate that children utilize cognitive factors such as EF when performing a creative task and as 
people age they rely less on cognitive factors, but have overall higher levels of creativity and all 
age groups undervalue the role of persistence in creative tasks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
To find creativity in the world (i.e., works that are both novel and useful, Sternberg & 
Lubart, 1999) one does not need to look far. The computer you are likely using to read this was 
once just a creative idea far from being realized. Though creative works are ubiquitous today 
(i.e., cellphones, computers, endless applications for those devices and great works of art such as 
novels, paintings, and even movies), understanding creative development and the factors that 
influence creativity remains elusive. Creativity is thought to emerge as early as 2 years of age 
(Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014; Hoicka, Bijvoet-van den Berg, Kerr, & Carberry, 2013) 
and increases until fourth grade when we see a sharp decline in creative achievement known as 
the fourth-grade slump (Claxton et al., 2005; Kim, 2011; Nash, 1974; Torrance, 1968). Few 
studies have examined underlying causes of this decline, though researchers have suggested the 
fourth-grade slump is caused by a change in the language and instructions used in the classroom 
as well as an increase in cognitive ability (Runco, 1986; Torrance, 1968). The current study 
examined how changes to language used within a creativity task influenced creative responses 
across the lifespan at first grade, fourth grade, and adulthood. Further, I explored how individual 
differences in cognition (e.g., using executive functions to hold more than one idea in mind at 
once) and motivation (e.g., believing that your creative ability can improve through hard work) 
related to creativity and the use of language in creative tasks. Through language and individual 
difference variables we can gain a better understanding of the development of creativity across 
the lifespan.   
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Theories of Creativity 
 
Most theorists agree that creativity is defined as an ability to produce work that is both 
novel and useful (Albert & Runco, 1999; Guilford, 1950; Runco, 1986; Sternberg & Lubart, 
1999). For example, the invention of the personal computer can be considered a creative work 
because it was a unique addition to technology that has proven to be useful, with most people 
unable to go a day without using one. One of the major theories of creativity is the investment 
theory proposed by Sternberg and Lubart (1995) who suggested that creative people “buy low 
and sell high” like good investors do. According to their theory, a creative individual will first 
generate ideas that are unpopular, buying low (e.g., the personal computer was met with 
skepticism and criticism because a home computer was not seen as necessary or useful). Second, 
creative people will attempt to convince other people that their ideas have worth (e.g., 
advertising the need for a computer at home). Lastly, they sell high letting other people pursue 
their ideas while they move on to the next unpopular idea (e.g., cell phones or laptops, Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1995; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). Creativity production has been suggested by many 
to operate in this fashion, with creative individuals finding an unexplored area where they can 
invest low and explore potentially unpopular ideas that will yield a large payoff if they can 
convince others of their need. 
Within the investment theory, Sternberg and Lubart (1995) propose six personal factors 
needed for creative achievement. The first, intelligence, has three aspects associated with 
creativity: (1) synthetic ability – the ability to generate ideas that are novel and high in quality, 
(2) analytical ability – the ability to judge the value of one’s own ideas and whether they are 
worth pursuing, and (3) practical ability – the ability to apply intellectual skills to everyday 
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situations (Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). All three of these aspects are important for creative 
achievement. For example, someone may be very good at thinking of new and unique ideas (i.e., 
synthetic ability), but may lack the ability to determine which of those ideas are worth pursuing 
and which are not (analytical ability) and thus may spend too much time devoted to unworthy 
ideas. Or they may lack practical abilities like being able to communicate their ideas to others. 
The second factor from the investment theory is knowledge. To achieve creatively one must have 
knowledge of what already exists and what people think about or their conventional notions 
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). A creative product must be unique and thus to create it, one needs to 
know whether that product already exists or has been attempted before. Yet the authors also 
caution that too much knowledge can hinder creative productivity. For example, knowing about 
an object’s original purpose can lead to declines in new and unique ways of viewing that item, 
known as functional fixedness (Adamson, 1952). Third, thinking styles are important to creative 
achievement. Thinking styles are ways in which people prefer to apply their knowledge and 
intelligence to a given problem. (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995; Sternberg, 1988). For example, a 
person may have a “legislative style” in which they prefer to handle tasks in their own way or an 
“executive style” where someone prefers a task specifically defined for them (Sternberg & 
Lubart, 1995). The fourth factor is personality. To achieve creatively a person must be willing to 
take risks and go against the status quo when buying low on an unpopular idea. Further, they 
must be courageous enough to stand up to people who believe the idea to be unnecessary or 
unworthy.  The fifth factor is motivation. A creative person needs both intrinsic motivation (i.e., 
personal desire or self-expression) and extrinsic motivation (i.e., money or power) in order to 
concentrate on the task (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). Lastly, a person needs the right 
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environmental context. A person can have all other five aspects for creativity, but be in an 
environment that does not allow creative ideas (e.g., a classroom where the teacher discourages 
new or unique ideas).  
Creativity Measurement. The study of creativity began by measuring eminent artists or 
scientists such as Picaso or Einstein. These people were hard to come by though and many 
researchers studied them posthumously making inferences difficult (Sternberg & Lubart 1999). 
Studying only famous creative individuals, and posthumously at that, limited the study of 
creativity according to Guilford (1950) by not allowing a full view of how creativity can interact 
in everyday situations. Therefore, Guilford proposed the use of a more psychometric approach 
involving tasks that could be quantified much like the IQ tests for intelligence and created 
several paper-and-pencil tasks including the Unusual Uses Task (also known as the Alternative 
Uses Task), where a person identifies as many uses for a common object (e.g., a brick) as they 
can (Guilford, 1975), allowing creativity to be exhibited by any person at any time. The scoring 
for this task is based on several factors that Guilford identified as being involved in creativity. 
The first factor, sensitivity to problems, is the ability to recognize that a problem exists. In the 
Alternative Uses Task example, this would represent knowing that we need to use a brick for a 
unique reason such as using it to hold a door open while we bring in groceries. Sensitivity to 
problems utilizes the analytic abilities described by Sternberg and Lubart (1995) where someone 
must recognize a problem and judge whether their own ideas to solving the problem are useful. 
The second factor is fluency, or the number of ideas generated. Someone scoring high on fluency 
would generate multiple unique ideas to use a brick. The third is flexibility or shifting 
approaches. To score high on flexibility each of the unique ideas generated needs to be in a 
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different category. For example, using the brick as a doorstop would be in a different category 
than using it as a weapon. However, using the brick to hit your sister would be in the same 
category as using it as a weapon. Flexibility utilizes Sternberg and Lubart’s (1995) practical 
ability of applying creative solutions to everyday situations. Specifically, to be considered 
flexible a person must switch between possible uses (situations) for each item. The last factor is 
originality or determining whether a use for an item is novel (e.g., synthetic abilities, Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1995). Using the brick to hold a Barbie funeral would be considered more original 
than using it as a weapon (Guilford, 1975). Other measures were developed drawing off of 
Guilford’s concepts of creativity (Houtz & Krug, 1995; Kim, 2011; for a review see Zeng, 
Proctor & Salvendy, 2011) with the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT, Torrance, 
1974) as perhaps the most popular method. The TTCT consists of two parts: a verbal scale where 
people are asked to generate numerous ideas to problems posed (e.g., stating different ways to 
use a conventional object such as a brick), and a figural scale where people actually produce 
creative works (e.g., completing a drawing). With this suggestion of using psychometric 
measures, the field took off in studying creativity psychometrically looking at what is known as 
divergent thinking, the ability to produce many unique solutions to a single problem as opposed 
to convergent thinking where one answer is required of the problem (Bijvoet-van den Berg, & 
Hoicka, 2014; Claxton, Pannells, & Rhoads, 2005; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Black, & Mccown, 2008; 
Runco, 1999).  
As the field of creativity shifted to understanding psychometric measures of creativity, 
individuals began to question the extent that measuring divergent thinking accurately assessed 
creativity. Whereas creativity is the ability to produce something that is both novel and useful 
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(Sternberg & Lubart, 1999), divergent thinking is the ability to produce multiple unique solutions 
to a single problem (Runco, 1999). Thus, divergent thinking may be thought to be a portion of 
creativity as it measures unique and novel ideas, but does not inherently capture what is useful. 
Although some researchers still believe that the best way to measure creativity is to use actual 
creative works that have shown to be useful in society (i.e., popular novels or works of art; 
Charles & Runco, 2001; Kim, 2011; Zeng, Proctor, & Salvendy, 2011), the majority of 
researchers use divergent thinking to better understand creativity due to the difficulties acquiring 
and measuring creative works (Bijvoet-van den Berg, & Hoicka, 2014; Charles & Runco, 2001; 
Claxton, Pannells, & Rhoads, 2005; Kim, 2011; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Black, & Mccown, 2008; 
Runco, 1999; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995; 1999; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). Divergent thinking 
tests also have an advantage over achievement-oriented measures in that it does not penalize for 
lack of expertise of productivity making it especially useful with children (Charles & Runco, 
2001).  
Development of Creativity. Research on divergent thinking has been conducted 
throughout the lifespan and this aspect of creativity has been found to emerge around 2 years of 
age (Bijvoet-van den Berg, & Hoicka, 2014) and increase thereafter with specific “slumps” 
during childhood and adolescence (Barbot, Lubart, & Besancon, 2016). Torrance (1967; 1968) 
described marked declines in creativity at three different time periods throughout life. The first 
slump occurs around preschool at about age 5. The next decline occurs around age nine, known 
colloquially in literature as the fourth-grade slump and the final slump occurs in adolescence 
around age 12 and then the development begins to level off in a slow decline until late adulthood 
(Torrance, 1967; 1968). However, there is disagreement on when exactly these slumps occur. 
7 
 
For example, Kim (2011) suggested that rather than a fourth-grade slump, the major decline 
occurs in the sixth grade, Charles and Runco (2011) suggested a peak in fourth grade rather than 
a slump, and Claxton, Pannells, and Rhoads (2005) found no significant decreases in creativity 
from fourth to ninth grade (except an increase in elaboration ability from sixth to ninth grade). 
The curvilinear nature of creativity is consistent with developmental theories (Charles & Runco, 
2001) that suggest sharp increases and declines in creativity throughout the lifespan. Though the 
exact age at which the slumps occur is being debated, the fourth-grade slump was one of the first 
discovered and therefore has become the most studied decline (Barbot et al., 2016).  
Explanations given for the various slumps tend to focus on an increase in convergent 
thinking (i.e., finding the single best answer to a problem or question; Cropley, 2006). For 
example, Kim (2011) argued that children’s ability to produce multiple ideas (fluency) decreases 
around fourth grade due to children becoming more concerned with representational accuracy 
than with creative output. For example, children may be more concerned with guessing the use 
for the object considered most correct by others (i.e., they would want to say that a brick was 
used to build a house, because that is what most people would think). Charles and Runco (2001) 
also suggest that creativity declines as children begin to understand which ideas other children 
would think of and which are appropriate; suggesting that if convergent thinking is valued by 
others it will be preferred to divergent thinking in children. The desire to reach representational 
accuracy is seen most clearly in standardized tests for children, where children are asked to select 
the most appropriate answer to each question. This emphasis on convergent thinking in 
standardized testing has become a popular theory among researchers to explain declines in 
creativity. For example, Kim (2011) argues that an increase in standardized testing and the 
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language used for instructions contributes to declines in creativity because it encourages children 
to shift emphasis toward rote learning and memory and away from creative solutions. Sternberg 
and O’Hara (1999) agree with Kim, stating that creative students are not benefiting from 
instructions given in school because they are focused more on memory and analytical abilities 
and less on the more important synthetic abilities of finding multiple solutions. Most notably, in 
1968 Torrance hypothesized that the school environment (i.e., value of convergent thoughts over 
divergent ones) and the need to pay attention to school rules around fourth grade attributed to the 
slumps. Other environmental factors such as parental practices (Mourgues, Barbot, Tan & 
Grigorenko, 2014), cultural factors (Dahlman, Backstron, Bohlin, & Frans, 2013) and 
experiences (e.g., parental death or poverty; Damian & Simonton, 2015) have been proposed to 
contribute to declines in creativity. However, these explanations emphasizing environment’s role 
in stressing convergent over divergent thinking have remained largely theoretical without 
empirical studies to support them.  
Factors that Influence Creativity 
 
Labeling. What is common across the explanations for creative decline is the role that 
language can play in communicating a convergent thinking emphasis (e.g., instructions leading 
children to think more convergently; Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966; Kim, 2011). Research on 
functional fixedness has, for example, explored how using labels can influence creativity. Taking 
the emphasis off a leading label in a functional fixedness task can aid in more creative solutions 
to a problem. More specifically, Glucksberg and Weisberg (1966) examined labels in the classic 
“candle problem”, in which adults were given a candle, a book of matches, and a box of thumb 
tacks and asked to find a way to affix the candle to a wall. In the standard condition, participants 
9 
 
were given a picture where the box of tacks was only labeled as “tacks” and the box becomes a 
functionally fixed object in that most people do not see it beyond its use of holding the tacks. 
Whereas in the label condition participants were given a picture in which the box and the tacks 
were labeled separately, and with this additional label participants were more likely to use the 
box on its own to achieve the goal of the task to tack the box to the wall to hold the candle 
(Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966). Having a label for each item increased creativity because 
people are better able to think about the purpose of each item individually rather than grouping 
them together. When grouped together it is harder to think of using the box as anything except 
for holding the tacks, whereas when we label them separately it becomes easier to think about 
using the box for another purpose.  
Work with labels in functional fixedness suggests that the type of label used on 
functionally fixed objects can influence performance on divergent thinking creativity tasks. 
However, this work has been conducted primarily with adults and within the realm of a 
functional fixedness task. Research with children show that children become more susceptible to 
functional fixedness as they age. Children as young as 6 and 7 years old have been shown to 
struggle with functional fixedness, whereas younger children aged 5 years seem to be immune to 
the phenomenon (German & Defeyter, 2000). It is possible that these young children are immune 
to functional fixedness because they have learned that items can have multiple labels (Waxman 
& Hatch, 1992), but have not yet become overly concerned with finding an appropriate label 
accepted by their teachers or parents (Kim, 2011). Therefore, school-age children may be able to 
understand multiple labels for objects, but are more likely to search for the most appropriate 
label that other peers, parents or teachers want them to use. Work points to the hypothesis that 
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one of the reasons children may begin to show a slump in school age is that they are given labels 
that promote convergent thinking as well as being taught to be aware of what labels are valued 
by teachers and peers (i.e., when asked to name an object the student knows the teacher prefers 
the label “brick”, this label then colors their interpretations of what you can do with that item, 
such as using it only as a “brick” and not as a “chair”). Thus, examining labels within a divergent 
thinking creativity task could be useful because labels may influence children to respond with 
more common uses for an item that they believe the researcher is searching for which may lead 
to lower performance on a divergent thinking creativity task. Because children are encouraged to 
think more convergently during the school years, these convergent labels may be especially 
influential during the fourth-grade slump (Charles & Runco, 2001; Kim, 2011). For example, 
recall that in divergent thinking tasks a child must come up with as many novel uses for an item 
as they can (e.g., a brick). Language theories would suggest that the label provided in this task 
will influence the way children solve this problem by bringing their attention to what the label 
represents (e.g., building a house), and filtering out all other possible alternative uses for the 
item, such as a chair (Kim, 2011; Waxman & Hatch, 1992). Therefore, making the labels within 
a task more ambiguous by using non-sense words, such as “pelganum” may be particularly 
helpful for school-age children leading to less influence of the more appropriate convergent 
labels they are used to for an object, such as “brick” when generating multiple novel uses for that 
object.   
Executive Function. As detailed by Sternberg and Lubart (1995), there are several 
cognitive and motivational factors that influence creativity, and these individual difference 
factors may also interact with the possible “slumps” we see in creativity across development. 
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One possible cognitive process that has been linked to creativity is executive function or EF 
(Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013; White & Shah, 2006; Zabelina, & Robinson, 2010). EF 
is the cognitive control processes by which people regulate thoughts and behaviors (Zelazo, 
Muller, Frye & Marcovitch, 2003). EF has been proposed to exist in a unity/diversity framework 
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012) whereby different component processes are correlated with one 
another because they share a common EF related to representing task information to guide 
behavior. The first component, inhibition, is the ability to inhibit a prepotent response (e.g., 
delaying a small for a larger reward later). The second component known as cognitive flexibility 
is the ability to switch between multiple mental sets or rule sets (e.g., switching between sorting 
rules). Lastly, working memory is the ability to hold information in mind while manipulating it 
(e.g., repeating a series of number digits backward; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, 
Howerter, & Wager, 2000).  
Considerations of EF components may be especially important to understanding 
creativity. All three components have been linked to creativity separately in adults. Young adults 
who score as highly creative have been found to have lower inhibitory control compared to those 
with lower creative ability, perhaps because this lack of inhibition allows them to access a 
greater number of stimuli or concepts during processing (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; 
White & Shah, 2006). Zabelina and Robinson (2010) demonstrated that highly creative young 
adults had an unusually high level of flexibility (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010), likely because 
they are better able to determine when utilizing automatic processes is beneficial and should not 
be interrupted (e.g., congruent trials on a Stroop task where one must say a color word written on 
the screen and the color of the ink matches the word written, such as the word “green” written in 
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green ink) and when it is better to switch to more consciously controlled system like EF (e.g., 
incongruent trials on a Stroop task where the color word and the color of the ink do not match, 
such as the word “green” written in yellow ink; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). In working 
memory research, Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, and Dandekar (2013) demonstrated that divergent thinking 
was associated with the prefrontal cortex linked to working memory (Fuster, 2001), suggesting 
those with higher working memory do better on divergent thinking tasks because they are better 
able to mentally manipulate objects along varying dimensions necessary during divergent 
thinking tasks (e.g., mentally rotating three shapes, ‘C’, ‘0’, ‘8’ to form a recognizable object 
like a smiley face; Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013). EF is still developing in school-age 
children and thus may influence creativity differently at this age, yet no one has examined EF 
effects on creativity in children.  
Mindset and Persistence. As with cognitive factors, personality and motivation factors 
are also important to creativity because they can help individuals overcome obstacles and persist 
through difficult creative tasks. Intrinsic motivation, or motivation that is centered within an 
individual, has been shown to be especially important to fostering creativity (Amabile,1985). 
Perhaps the most influential work on intrinsic motivational styles belongs to Carol Dweck (2006) 
and her two motivational frameworks, or mindsets, that set the stage for the way people view 
their abilities. The first is a fixed mindset where a person believes their abilities are static and 
cannot be changed (Dweck, 2006). For example, a person may believe they are not good at math 
and no amount of studying can improve this ability. A growth mindset, on the other hand, is 
someone who believes that they can change their abilities with hard work (Dweck, 2006). In this 
instance, a person would seek out difficult math challenges to help them learn and grow and not 
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be discouraged by failures. Individuals with a growth mindset seek out challenges and thrive 
when problems become difficult, whereas those with a fixed mindset prefer to tackle problems 
that are easy for them to solve (Dweck, 2006). With this in mind, it is hypothesized that 
individuals with a growth mindset would persist longer during both convergent thinking 
problems and divergent creativity problems that are more difficult and ask them to stretch their 
imagination and solve problems in a different way, while those with a fixed mindset would 
persist only on easier convergent thinking problems where the solution is quicker to find.  
Mindset has been linked to creativity and creative self-concepts as well. Karwowski 
(2014) found that a growth mindset was positively associated with creative self-concept (i.e., 
self-efficacy for creativity), and a fixed mindset was negatively related to efficacy when solving 
insight problems (i.e., solving a creative problem suddenly in an “aha” like experience) in adults 
(Bowden & Beeman, 1998). Susan O’Neill (2011) examined the mindsets of young musicians 
and discovered that many had been told they were “gifted” or “talented” repeatedly and 
developed a fixed mindset as a result, believing that their musical abilities lied in their static 
talent rather than in their hard work. When a growth mindset was fostered, however, these young 
musicians took more risks, performed better during concerts, and dealt with setbacks better than 
their fixed mindset counterparts. O’Neill’s research is in line with Dweck’s (2007) findings that 
verbal praise can hinder a growth mindset, and subsequently achievement, when directed toward 
the wrong things. Praise for static abilities, talents, and being “smart” lead to a fixed mindset, 
whereas praise for effort and hard work can nurture a growth mindset (Dweck, 2007), suggesting 
that mindset, like creativity, may be influenced by labels.  
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An important part of the growth mindset that may impact creativity is resilience or 
persistence. Generating novel and useful ideas is not always an easy or quick task. Persistence 
allows individuals to push through difficulties during the creative process. In a survey of 143 
creativity researchers, Dweck (2006) found that the researchers consistently rated the factors of 
perseverance and resilience within a growth mindset as the most important factors contributing 
to creative achievement. Lucas and Nordgren (2015) provided more information on the role of 
persistence in creativity by demonstrating that persistence was a critical component of creative 
performance for adults even when people underestimated it. Specifically, in a series of studies, 
undergraduate participants were asked how many more responses they would generate on the 
Alternative Uses Creativity Task if they were allowed more time. Consistently, people indicated 
that they would likely not generate many more ideas if allowed more time even though they did 
in fact generate more responses and more creative responses on creativity measures after being 
allowed more time than on previous attempts, suggesting that people underestimate the value of 
persistence in creative achievement. These results reinforce the idea that persistence may be a 
leading factor contributing to creative achievement (Dweck, 2006) by demonstrating that when 
one persists through a difficult problem they are able to develop more novel creative solutions to 
a problem, even when they do not believe that they will.  
The Present Study 
 
Creativity is thought to have a curvilinear pattern of development with several sharp 
increases as well as quick declines with the most common decline occurring around the fourth-
grade before leveling out in adolescence (Torrance, 1968). Children in first-grade, fourth-grade 
and adults were selected to coincide with popular trends in development and slumps in children. 
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Specifically, children in first-grade are thought to be experiencing an increase in creativity 
(Barbot, Lubart, & Besancon, 2016; Torrance, 1967), whereas fourth-graders are thought to be 
experiencing the most discussed slump (Barbot et al., 2016; Claxton, Pannells & Rhoads, 2005; 
Torrance, 1697). Adults are included in this sample for two reasons: (1) developmentally their 
creativity should have reached an asymptote after another increase during adolescence and (2) 
some studies using labels (Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966), EF (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew & Dandekar, 
2013; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) persistence (Lucas & Nordgren, 2015) and mindset (Dweck, 
2006) were not conducted within developmental psychology and therefore only utilized adult 
participants and the current study aims to replicate these results with adults while extending them 
to children.  
Looking at divergent thinking creativity levels in the Alternative Uses Task, I examined 
the possibility of a fourth-grade slump and how individual differences in EF and mindset relate 
to creativity across the lifespan. First, I examined the developmental nature of creativity by 
hypothesizing that (1) children in first-grade would have the highest divergent thinking scores 
when given standard instructions on the Alternative Uses Task (Wallach & Kogen, 1965), 
followed by adults, then fourth-graders. Second, I looked at individual difference variables that 
contributed to baseline levels of creativity. Cognitive EF processes are thought to aid in 
developing creative thought through inhibition (e.g., less inhibition leads to the generation of 
more ideas, Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; White & Shah, 2006), cognitive flexibility (e.g., 
aid in the ability to switch from one way of thinking to another, Zabelina & Robinson, 2010), 
and working memory (e.g., allowing individuals to think about multiple items to come up with 
more creative solutions, Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013). Thus, I hypothesized (2) 
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individuals with higher EF factors of cognitive flexibility and working memory would have 
higher divergent thinking ability, whereas inhibition would be negatively associated with 
divergent thinking across all age groups, but the strongest relationship would be seen in adults. 
Lastly, a person’s mindset (e.g., fixed mindset where abilities are static versus growth mindset 
where abilities can develop and change) has been shown to be a significant personality variable 
important to creativity (Dweck, 2006; Lucas & Nordgren, 2015). Therefore, I hypothesized (3) 
individuals with a growth mindset would have higher divergent thinking scores than those with a 
fixed mindset across all age groups.  
The fourth-grade slump has been theorized to occur due to strict instructions in school 
that promote convergent thinking and memory as opposed to divergent thought and creativity. In 
the present study, I also examined whether labels influenced children’s creative thought related 
to the Alternative Uses Task. More specifically, in the Alternative Uses Task I provided children 
with either the typically presented non-ambiguous label hypothesized to encourage more 
convergent thinking leading children to the “appropriate” response for an ambiguous looking 
object (e.g., a lightbulb used to light a room), or an ambiguous label hypothesized to encourage 
less convergent thought (e.g., labeling the same item as a “pelganum” or “blicket” may 
encourage an unconventional or at least not prompt a prototypical convergent response). Objects 
presented were ambiguous looking so that participants would not be influenced by the look of 
the item rather than the label used. Using the different labeling conditions, I hypothesized that 
(4) though all age groups would have a slight increase in divergent thinking scores when given 
an ambiguous label (i.e., a “pelganum”), children in fourth-grade would benefit most because the 
ambiguous label would help fourth-graders overcome the search for the convergent answer and 
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allow for creative solutions similar to first-grade levels. Further, I hypothesized that (5) for first 
graders, EF (cognitive flexibility and working memory, but not inhibition) would generally help 
them with creativity production, but would not depend on the types of labels used (i.e., 
ambiguous or non-ambiguous). However, for fourth-graders and adults, better EF ability would 
significantly help individuals become more creative when using a non-ambiguous label and 
would only have a slight impact when using an ambiguous label. 
Finally, Lucas and Nordgren (2015) found that adults typically undervalue the 
effectiveness of persisting through divergent thinking tasks. The current study attempted to 
replicate these results demonstrated with adults and determine how children view their 
persistence during the divergent thinking task. Specifically, participants completed an 
Alternative Uses Task for one minute and then were asked how many more ideas they believed 
they could generate if given more time. As in Lucas and Nordgren (2015), individuals who 
believed they would generate less ideas were thought to undervalue persistence, whereas 
individuals who believed they would generate more ideas overvalued persistence. Looking at 
how many ideas participants believed they would generate, I hypothesized that (6) adults would 
undervalue their persistence and have higher levels of creativity than they estimated, whereas 
children in first- and fourth-grade would either overvalue their persistence or correctly estimate 
it. Previous research has demonstrated that children overestimate their abilities when comparing 
themselves to others (Butler, 1990), but research on how they view persistence on divergent 
thinking creativity tasks has not been done before. Further, (7) it is hypothesized that both 
children and adults with a growth mindset would correctly estimate or overvalue their 
persistence since they thrive on being given difficult problems where they can work harder for 
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longer periods of time, whereas those with a fixed mindset would be more likely to undervalue 
persistence.  
 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
 
 
 
II. METHOD 
Participants 
 
 Participants were 45 first-graders (M = 7.13, SD = .78; 23 girls and 22 boys), 41 fourth-
graders (M = 9.95, SD = .80; 18 girls and 23 boys) and 100 adults (M = 19.05, SD = .89; 68 
women, 31 men and 1 declined to state). Three first-graders were removed from analyses due to 
both peer interference (i.e., a friend told them to stop playing after receiving prizes) and inflated 
persistence scores (i.e., estimating they would generate 1,609 more responses to the divergent 
thinking creativity task), resulting in 42 first-graders included in the final sample. Removing 
these participants did not significantly change the demographic of the age group (M = 7.13, SD = 
.80, 21 girls and 21 boys). Participants were predominately white (first-grade: 83.3% White, 
4.8% Hispanic, 11.9% did not state ethnicity; fourth-grade: 39% White, 61% did not state 
ethnicity; adults: 70% white, 18% African American 6% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3% 
Hispanic/Latino(a), 2% Mixed Race and 1% Indian/Hindu). Children in each age group were 
recruited from local schools and from the community in a small town in the Southern United 
States. Children received small prizes for participating. Children participated at multiple 
locations including: a laboratory on the University campus (32 participants), local elementary 
schools (53 participants) and a home visit (1 participant). At each location a child participated in 
a quiet room. Adults participated in exchange for course credit in an undergraduate psychology 
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course at a medium sized University in the Southern United States. All adults participated in the 
same quiet room on the University campus.  
Procedure 
 
 After obtaining parental consent and verbal assent (children) or signed consent (adults) to 
participate in the study, participants completed 3 EF tasks (i.e., Backward Digit Span, 
Dimensional Change Card Sort Task, and Delay of Gratification Task), measures of divergent 
thinking (i.e., Alternative Uses Task [AUT] baseline, AUT persistence and AUT label), a 
mindset questionnaire, and lastly the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence-Vocabulary 
measure of verbal IQ. These were presented in a fixed order to equate order effects, common of 
individual differences studies (Carlson & Moses, 2001).   
Measures  
 
 Backward Digit Span (BDS). The backward digit span assessed working memory by 
having individuals hold digits in mind while reproducing them backward (Carlson, Moses, & 
Breton, 2002). Children were introduced to a puppet named “Leo the lion” who was a silly lion 
because he said numbers backward.  In the training phase, children were instructed to repeat a 
string of two numbers backward (i.e., “if I say 1, 2, Leo would say 2, 1”). Children were then 
given two similar training trials in which they were corrected if they were wrong. Children had 
to independently answer what Leo would say on two different trials to pass training and move on 
to testing trials. If children did not pass the training phase (n=2) the testing phase was skipped, 
and children moved on to the next task. In the testing phase, children were presented with three 
two-digit trials and asked to produce the numbers backward. Next, the experimenter increased 
the digit span to three numbers and the procedure was repeated. The experimenter continued to 
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give children three trials at each span before increasing the span by one digit. Testing was 
terminated once either the experimenter reached a seven-digit span (n=1) or children gave three 
incorrect answers in a row. Adults completed the same training phase and task, but began with a 
three-digit span instead of the two digits used for children and without the use of the lion puppet. 
Testing was terminated after three incorrect responses in a row. Adults had the opportunity to 
reach an eleven-digit span (though the highest digit span reached by any adult in the sample was 
nine). The highest digit-span where an individual had at least one correct trial (out of three trials) 
was measured.  
 Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS). This task measured cognitive flexibility by 
having individuals switch between multiple rules while sorting cards by color or shape (Zelazo, 
Frye, & Rapus, 1996). Children saw two sorting boxes on the lower edges of a computer screen 
consisting of a yellow flower and green car (see Figure 1). Children were then presented with six 
pre-switch trials in which they were asked to sort target cards (e.g., a yellow car or green flower) 
that appeared in the middle of the screen based on one dimension (e.g., color). Next, children 
were presented with six post-switch trials in which they were asked to switch and sort by a new 
dimension (e.g., shape). Finally, children were presented with 12 “borders” trials in which they 
were asked to sort by both color and shape in random order based on the border around the card 
(e.g., if the card had a border they sorted by shape, if not they sorted by color). The number of 
correct “borders” trials was measured for cognitive flexibility in children.  
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Figure 1. Diagram of the DCCS. Diagram by condition (pre-switch, post-switch, and borders or 
switch trials). Adults screen differ in two ways (1) the instructions for condition (i.e., the word 
“color” or “shape” for sorting condition) appear between the two boxes on the bottom of the 
screen and (2) there are no borders surrounding the test card during switch trials.  
 
Adults completed a similar computer-based task where instructions for each trial (i.e., 
sort by color or shape) was written at the bottom of the computer screen rather than spoken aloud 
as in the children’s task. Since instructions appeared at the bottom of the screen before each trial, 
there were no borders around each target card for adults. There were 12 pre-switch trials where 
participants sorted by one dimension (i.e., color) and 12 post-switch trials where participants 
sorted by another dimension (i.e., shape) and 24 “mixed” trials where participants had to switch 
between sorting by the two dimensions. The number of correct “mixed” trials was calculated as a 
measure of cognitive flexibility.  
 Delay of Gratification Task (DoG). Inhibitory control was measured by having children 
choose whether they preferred to receive a smaller reward at the time of the experiment or a 
larger reward once the experiment was over (Prencipe & Zelazo, 2005). A training phase was 
used in which the experimenter introduced children to the task by displaying a laminated card 
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with pictures of an immediate reward on the left (e.g. one sticker) and a delayed reward on the 
right (e.g., eight stickers). The researcher explained that if they chose one sticker now, it would 
be placed into a plastic cup that they were able to play with immediately. However, if they chose 
eight stickers later, the stickers were placed into an envelope that they could have at the end of 
the experiment. The experimenter then demonstrated the task by making a now decision for 1 vs. 
1 and a later decision for 1 vs. 8.  Once the children were familiar with the process the researcher 
displayed one card at a time with the following ratios: 1 reward now vs. 2 later, 1 reward now vs. 
4 later and 1 reward now vs. 6 later. The ratios were the same for three types of rewards: stickers, 
pennies and erasers.  Nine trials were given and the total number of times the child chose to 
delay the reward was measured.  
 Adults completed a different DoG task that used a hypothetical scenario rather than 
stickers, pennies and erasers (Romer, Duckworth, Sznitman & Park, 2010). This task was used to 
be more relatable for adults than choosing between small rewards offered to children. In this task 
participants were asked about a hypothetical scenario in which they completed a job worth $500. 
Their employer then asked if they preferred to receive the $500 payment now, or if they would 
be interested in receiving $1,000 six months later. Depending on how the participant responded 
(either $500 now or $1,000 later) the amount increments changed accordingly. For example, if 
they chose $500 now initially, they were next asked if they would still choose to receive the 
money now if the job was worth $400, then $300, then $200, then $100. If they originally 
accepted the $1,000 later, they were asked if they would still accept the money later if the job 
would pay $900, then $800, then $700, then $600 later. The amount at which the participant 
decided to change their answer (or the final amount if they never changed their answer) was 
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measured on a scale from 0 (always chose to accept the money now) to 9 (always chose to accept 
the money later).  
Alternative Uses Task. The Alternative Uses Task (AUT) was used to measure 
divergent thinking because it has been widely used and is a reliable measure that is thought to be 
appropriate in measuring creativity (Houtz & Krug, 1995; Plucker & Renzulli, 1999; Torrance, 
1968; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Three different versions of the AUT were used in this study: 
AUT baseline, AUT persistence and AUT label.  
AUT Baseline. The baseline version of the AUT followed the classic method used in 
Wallach and Kogan (1965) where individuals were given the following instructions:  
“In this game, I am going to name an object—any kind of object like a cup or the 
floor—and it will be your job to tell me lots of different ways that the object could 
be used. Any object can be used in a lot of different ways. For example, think 
about a string. What are some of the ways you can think of that you might use a 
string?” (The experimenter lets the participant try). “Yes, those are fine. I was 
thinking that you could also use the string to attach a fish hook, to jump rope, to 
sew with, to hang clothes on, and to pull shades.” (The experimenter varies her 
suggestions so as not to duplicate any the child has provided.) “There are lots 
more too, and yours were very good examples. I can see that you already 
understand how to play this game. So let’s begin now. And remember, think of 
different ways you could use the object that I name. Here we go.” 
 
Then individuals were asked to name as many unique uses for each item (i.e., a brick, a 
cardboard box, a shoe, and a chair) as they could to get a baseline of their creative ability. These 
items were selected after pilot testing with a group of younger children to determine which 
objects they would be familiar enough with to generate responses. Participants were given one 
minute to respond to each of the four items. Responses were coded based on fluency (number of 
items generated), flexibility (number of categories generated) and originality (percentage of 
novel responses based on sample). Coding for this task is discussed in detail below.  
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AUT Persistence. After the first minute, participants were asked “how many more uses 
could you come up with if given more time” to measure the value they place on persistence 
(Lucas & Nordgren, 2015). After responding, individuals were given another minute to respond 
with as many unique uses for the item as they could. Participants were asked to complete the 
AUT baseline measure for one word (i.e., brick) then asked about persistence, then completed 
the AUT persistence measure for the same word. Once participants completed all three tasks 
(AUT baseline, persistence question, AUT persistence) for the first word, they moved on to the 
second (i.e., cardboard box) and so on until they went through all four words.   
 AUT Label. The label version of the AUT again included instructions where the 
individual must name as many unique uses of an item as they can within one minute. Individuals 
were given one minute to complete this task to match the first minute allowed in the AUT 
baseline measure. Individuals were read the following instructions: 
“Ok, just like in the last game, I am going to ask you to come up with as many 
ways you can use an object as you can think of. In this game though, I am going 
to show you the object and you can look at it while you think.” 
 
 However, in this task, half of participants were given instructions using ambiguous labels for 
items (i.e., “pelganum”, “bup”, “sharitnim”, and “blicket”), whereas the other half of participants 
were given non-ambiguous labels for items (e.g., “dinosaur”, “car”, “bubble wand”, and “light 
bulb”). The name of each item was read aloud to each participant (i.e., “this is a 
‘pelganum/dinosaur’, how many different ways could you use this ‘pelganum/dinosaur’”). 
Participants in both the ambiguous label condition and the non-ambiguous label condition were 
shown an object that can be seen to match the description of the non-ambiguous label for each 
object but is ambiguous enough that it can be seen as something else if given the ambiguous 
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label (see Figure 2). In this task, participants were shown an object to examine whether answers 
to the unique uses were similar or different depending on the label used (i.e., does a person give 
the same uses for a “dinosaur” as they do for a “pelganum”). Having a tangible object to 
represent the item in both conditions allows for variability to be attributed to the label and not the 
object itself. The items were shown in the same order to each participant whether they were 
given an ambiguous or a non-ambiguous label to account for ordering effects. If a participant 
asked for clarification on what a certain word meant in either condition the experimenter simply 
said, “just do the best you can, how many different ways can you use this (label of item)”. Again, 
the fluency, flexibility and originality scores were used as three dependent variables for AUT 
label.  
    
 
Figure 2. AUT objects. Objects used in second version of the AUT task. Labels for each object 
for both the ambiguous and concrete condition are as follows: (1) “pelganum” or “dinosaur” (2) 
“bup” or “car” (3) “sharitnum” or “bubble wand” and (4) “blicket” or “light-bulb 
 
 Coding of the AUT. There are four ways to measure divergent thinking on the AUT: 
fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration (the amount of detail that is given during the 
response; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Most researchers do not examine elaboration unless it is a 
direct research question (Bijvoet van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014, Hocevar & Michael, 1979, 
Hoicka, Bijvoet-van den Berg, Kerr & Carberry, 2013; Runco, 1986), since I was interested in 
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the amount (fluency) and originality of responses more than the detail provided during responses, 
the current study only examines fluency, flexibility and originality.  
Fluency was calculated for each of the creativity variables in this study: AUT baseline, 
AUT persistence and AUT label. Responses (i.e., each alternative use the participant stated) to 
the AUT were digitized by researchers using Microsoft Excel. Fluency for each item was 
calculated by adding all responses for that item on the AUT. If an item was repeated in exact or 
near exact terms such as “build a house” and “build house”, the item was only counted once 
(e.g., given a score of “1”) toward fluency so that only unique items were calculated. Items that 
were similar, but not exact were counted as separate items. For example, if someone said, “build 
a house” and “build a wall” those would be counted as separate items (e.g., give a score of “2”; 
Dippo & Kudrowitz, 2013). A total fluency score for each item was measured. Descriptive 
information for fluency of all participants can be found in Table 1. Participants were allowed to 
skip questions at any point during the procedure. Due to this, there were several points of 
missing data during the AUT baseline (first-grade: n=1 for “shoe”, n=2 for “chair”), AUT 
persistence (first-grade: n=3 for “shoe” and n=2 for “chair”) and AUT label  (first-grade: n=1 for 
“bubble-wand” and “lightbulb”; fourth-grade: n=1 for “lightbulb”) where a participant chose to 
skip to the next item. All missing data was handled pairwise for fluency, flexibility and 
originality.  
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Table 1. AUT Descriptives. Baseline=AUT baseline; Persistence=AUT persistence; Label=AUT 
label. Box=Cardboard box; Bubble=bubble-wand; Light=lightbulb, Amb Label = Ambiguous 
label condition, NA Label = Non-Ambiguous Label Condition   
 
 Flexibility, or the number of categories used, was calculated for the AUT baseline, AUT 
persistence and AUT label. Responses were coded into a keyword or keyphrase to categorize 
similar answers (Dippo & Kudrowitz, 2013). For example, responses such as “build house” and 
“build school” were both given a category keyword of “build” for responses to “brick”, whereas 
“throw at someone” and “hit someone” were both given a category keyword of “weapon”. All 
keywords generated can be found in Appendix A. Keywords were generated by four separate 
researchers based on criteria outlined in Dippo and Kudrowitz (2013). Researchers first worked 
separately to generate keywords for each item then all researchers came together to ensure that 
 
 Total First-Grade Fourth-Grade Adult 
 N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD 
Baseline             
    Brick 182 5.52 2.63 41 3.83 1.97 41 5.83 3.22 100 6.09 2.32 
    Box 182 6.16 2.80 41 4.73 2.79 41 6.41 3.38 100 6.65 2.33 
    Shoe 181 5.41 2.71 40 3.78 1.95 41 5.80 2.69 100 5.90 2.74 
    Chair 180 5.95 2.66 39 4.38 2.10 41 5.71 2.91 100 6.66 2.48 
    Total 182 5.74 2.32 41 4.13 1.80 41 5.94 2.69 100 6.33 2.04 
Persistence             
    Brick 182 3.14 2.47 41 2.80 2.40 41 4.05 2.99 100 2.91 2.18 
    Box 182 3.24 2.48 41 2.27 1.55 41 4.37 3.44 100 3.17 2.13 
    Shoe 179 2.68 2.28 38 1.84 1.73 41 2.98 2.81 100 2.88 2.18 
    Chair 180 2.75 2.11 39 1.85 1.44 41 3.05 2.57 100 2.98 2.04 
    Total  182 2.94 1.95 41 2.16 1.24 41 3.61 2.59 100 2.99 1.78 
Amb Label             
    
Dinosaur 
90 4.82 2.79 21 3.81 2.58 20 4.35 3.36 49 5.45 2.50 
    Car 90 4.47 2.34 21 3.57 2.32 20 4.60 2.95 49 4.80 2.01 
    Bubble 89 4.22 2.67 20 3.15 2.50 20 4.10 3.31 49 4.71 2.35 
    Light 88 4.63 2.38 20 3.70 2.13 19 5.11 2.92 49 4.82 2.19 
   Total 90 4.50 2.33 21 3.48 2.20 20 4.49 2.99 49 4.94 1.97 
NA Label             
    
Dinosaur 
91 5.32 2.37 19 4.26 2.58 21 5.76 2.57 51 5.53 2.12 
    Car 91 5.30 2.41 19 4.53 2.44 21 6.19 2.14 51 5.22 2.43 
    Bubble 91 5.16 2.34 19 4.74 3.51 21 6.00 3.11 51 4.98 1.95 
    Light  91 4.91 2.42 19 4.32 3.09 21 5.67 2.54 51 4.82 2.03 
    Total  91 5.17 2.15 19 4.46 2.68 21 5.91 2.36 51 5.14 1.77 
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agreement was met on which keyword/keyphrase each response belonged to. If a response had a 
two-part answer (e.g., “wash it and drink out of it”) the overall message was used to categorize 
the response (e.g., “drinking out of”) to ensure that the flexibility score was not inflated 
compared to the fluency score. Once each response for all items (e.g., brick, chair, etc…) had 
been given a category keyword/keyphrase the number of categories for each participant were 
added together to provide one flexibility score for each item on the AUT per participant. These 
scores were then totaled for each item on the AUT baseline (i.e., “brick”, “cardboard box”, 
“shoe” and “chair”), on the AUT persistence (i.e., the second set of responses to the same items 
as in AUT baseline), and on the AUT label (i.e., “dinosaur/pelganum”, “car/bup”, “bubble-
wand/sharitnim”, and “light-bulb/blicket”) to be used as the dependent variables (Hocevar & 
Michael, 1979; Runco, 1986; Silvia, Winterstein, Willse, Barona, Cram, Hess, et al., 2008). 
Cronbach’s alpha measuring internal consistency for flexibility scores on the AUT baseline was 
.85, on the AUT persistence was .85, and on the AUT label was .87.  
 Originality, or the uniqueness of each response, was then coded by the primary researcher 
for each of the dependent variables. After providing each response with a category keyword, 
each keyword was entered alphabetically into a spreadsheet. Every individual response from 
each participant, across all age groups, was then entered under its corresponding category 
keyword to assess originality. Repeated responses between participants were only entered once 
and participant numbers were entered next to each response to calculate how many participants 
gave each response. For example, 62 participants across all age groups stated that you could 
“build a house” with a “brick”. Following divergent thinking coding scheme for originality by 
Hoicka, Bijvoet-van den Berg, Kerr & Carberry (2013), responses that were made by less than 
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5% of participants across all age groups received a score of “3”, responses by 6-20% of 
participants received a score of “2”, responses given by 21-50% of participants was given a score 
of “1” and responses made by over 50% of participants was given a score of “0”. Several 
answers were given that were merely a description of the item (e.g., “it’s black” or “it has 
edges”). These answers were given a score of “0” for originality since they did not list an actual 
use of the item across all age groups. Originality scores were averaged for one originality score 
for AUT baseline, AUT persistence and AUT label per participant. Cronbach’s alpha measuring 
internal consistency among originality scores for the AUT baseline was .51, for the AUT 
persistence was .44, and for the AUT label was .52.  
 Mindset Questionnaire. An 8-item questionnaire was used to assess individuals’ 
mindset (Dweck, 2006). The mindset questionnaire consisted of 4 items related to a fixed 
mindset (i.e., “you can always learn things, but you can’t really change how smart you are”) and 
4 items to assess a growth mindset (i.e., “you can always change your talent a good amount, no 
matter how much you have”). Four items used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “disagree 
big time” to 6 “agree big time” and the other four items used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 “agree big time” to 6 “disagree big time”.  Adults completed the same questionnaire as 
children but used different Likert anchors ranging from 1 “disagree a lot” to 6 “agree a lot” in 
order to use more adult language. Internal reliability for the Mindset Questionnaire was 0.56. A 
total score was calculated for mindset by summing all responses together. Higher scores 
indicated more of a growth mindset and lower scores indicated more of a fixed mindset.  
 Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence- Vocabulary (WASI-Vocabulary). 
During the AUT we examined whether the use of an ambiguous or non-ambiguous label would 
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influence the creative output for children and adults. Since this study is verbal in nature through 
the use of labels and determining if EF contributed to creativity above and beyond language, the 
vocabulary section of the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale (WASI; Ricketts, Nation & 
Bishop, 2007) was used to account for vocabulary ability. The WASI was created to use for 
adults and children ages six and up. Participants were instructed to state the meaning of a word 
after it was read aloud to them. The task was terminated after either three consecutive incorrect 
responses or reaching the maximum number of words; 28 words for adults, 22 words for 
children. For each item the participant was able to score either 2 points when demonstrating clear 
understanding of the word; 1 point when demonstrating vague understanding of the word; or 0 
points if they did not know the word or provided an incorrect answer. A total raw score was used 
to assess vocabulary where higher scores indicated better vocabulary understanding.  
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III. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics, Transformations, Outlier Analysis, and Missing Data 
 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2. There were two variables that were further 
subjected to transformations and outlier removal. The adult version of the DCCS produced 
negatively skewed data (skewness=-2.91 and kurtosis=9.27). Following guidelines from 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Howell (2007) a log transformation was conducted on the data 
with a reflective component (NEWvariable = log10(k-x) where k = constant from which a new 
score is subtracted so the smallest score is 1 which is usually equal to the largest score plus 1). 
This transformation of cognitive flexibility in adults is reported and used in analyses (new 
skewness= 0.80, kurtosis=.44). For AUT persistence, a difference score was calculated to 
determine whether participants overvalued, undervalued or correctly estimated their persistence 
on the AUT task. Box plot analyses indicated there were two positive outliers that fell above 
2.194 (Q3 + 2.0 * interquartile range) and four negative outliers that fell below -2.043 (Q1 – 2.0 
* interquartile range; Sheskin, 2004). These six cases were removed from analyses. Several tasks 
included missing data. The BDS had two cases of missing data for children who did not pass the 
training phase. The Mindset questionnaire, persistence, and the AUT creativity task each had 
four cases of missing data where children decided to stop testing before reaching the task. The 
WASI-Vocabulary task included four cases where children decided to stop the session before 
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reaching the task and one case where a parent picked a child up early and the child was unable to 
complete the task to receive a total score. All missing data was handled pairwise. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. BDS = Backward Digit Span (Working Memory), DCCS = 
Dimension Change Card Sort (Cognitive Flexibility), DoG = Delay of Gratification Task 
(Inhibition); Ambig = Ambiguous labeling condition, Non-Am = Non-ambiguous labeling 
condition.  
 
There were low to moderate correlations between different components of EF, see Table 
3A and 3B (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). Only the BDS and DCCS were correlated in children, r = 
.39, p < .001 and DoG task and DCCS were negatively correlated in adults, r = -.21, p = .03. 
These results paired with the increasing divergence in later childhood (Lehto, Juujarvi, Kooistra 
& Pulkkinen, 2003) and my hypotheses of differential contributions to creativity (e.g., positive 
correlations with WM, measured by BDS, and cognitive flexibility, measured by DCCS, and 
negative correlations with inhibition, measured by DoG) led me to examine the three EF 
components separately in the analyses. Correlations between baseline creativity (i.e., fluency 
  First Grade  Fourth Grade  Adult 
 N Range M(SD) N Range M(SD) N Range M(SD) 
Age 42 5.22-8.84 7.13(.80) 41 8.66-12.01 9.96(.79) 100 18-22 19.05(.89) 
EF Variables          
   BDS 42 0-5 3.12(.97) 40 3-7 4.16(1.09) 100 3-9 5.60(1.10) 
   DCCS 42 3-12 7.74(.26) 41 5-12 9.47(2.22) 100 10-24 22.21(2.68) 
   DoG 42 0-9 6.52(2.71) 41 2-9 6.54(2.10) 100 0-9 5.46(2.28) 
Vocabulary 38 0-28 13.39(7.10) 40 6-37 23.58(7.06) 100 7-43 29.85(6.94) 
Mindset 40 8.00-43.00 23.78(8.87) 41 10.00-29.00 22.37(4.51) 98 15.00-33.00 24.43(3.86) 
Fluency 
    Baseline 
    Persistence 
    Label 
 
41 
41 
 
 
.67-8.75 
.00-4.75 
 
 
4.13(1.80) 
2.16(1.24) 
 
 
41 
41 
 
 
1.00-12.75 
.00-10.50 
 
 
5.94(2.69) 
3.61(2.59) 
 
 
100 
100 
 
2.00-12.75 
.00-8.50 
 
 
6.33(2.04) 
2.99(1.78) 
 
        Ambig 21 .00-7.25 3.48(2.20) 20 .75-13.00 4.49(2.99) 49 2.25-12.50 4.94(1.97) 
       Non-Am 19 1.00-12.50 4.46(2.70) 21 2.75-11.25 5.90(2.36) 51 1.25-11.25 5.14(1.77) 
Flexibility 
    Baseline 
    Persistence 
    Label 
 
41 
41 
 
.50-5.00 
.00-3.75 
 
 
2.76(1.06) 
1.68(.97) 
 
 
41 
41 
 
1.00-7.50 
.00-6.00 
 
 
4.07(1.60) 
2.50(1.54) 
 
 
100 
100 
 
1.75-8.25 
.00-6.75 
 
 
4.78(1.30) 
2.37(1.31) 
 
        Ambig 21 .00-5.00 2.58(1.35) 20 .75-9.50 3.26(2.05) 49 2.00-7.25 3.80(1.18) 
        Non-Am 21 1.00-5.50 2.88(1.35) 21 1.50-8.50 4.18(1.73)  51 1.25-7.50 3.79(1.25) 
Originality 
    Baseline 
    Persistence 
    Label 
 
41 
41 
 
.00-2.31 
.00-3.00 
 
 
1.49(.44) 
1.72(.64) 
 
 
41 
41 
 
.54-2.28 
.00-2.75 
 
 
1.68(.41) 
1.92(.64) 
 
 
100 
100 
 
.63-2.39 
.00-6.58 
 
 
1.56(.30) 
1.90(.76) 
 
        Ambig 21 .00-2.66 1.79(.64) 20 1.00-2.75 1.92(.51) 49 1.39-2.55 2.02(.25) 
        Non-Am 19 .25-2.69 1.65(.70) 21 1.32-2.60 2.10(.33) 51 .75-2.44 1.91(.32) 
Persistence 41 .00-16.00 3.80(4.18) 41 .00-62.00 6.78(10.42) 100 .00-49.00 6.71(7.21) 
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flexibility and originality) and age, mindset, WASI-Vocabulary, and EF performance in the BDS 
(i.e., WM), DCCS (i.e., cognitive flexibility) and DoG task (i.e., inhibition) are presented in table 
3A and 3B and reveal a different relationship for children compared to for adults. For children, 
those who performed better on the BDS (i.e., higher working memory) showed better fluency 
and flexibility on the AUT, while those who performed better on the DCCS (i.e., better cognitive 
flexibility) had higher flexibility scores on the AUT. Age was also related to fluency, flexibility 
and originality on the AUT, such that children performed better on each as they age. However, 
for adults, those who performed well on the DCCS (i.e., higher cognitive flexibility) actually 
showed worse flexibility and originality on the AUT, while those who did well on the DoG task 
(i.e., better inhibition) performed better on flexibility on the AUT. Children and adults showed a 
similar trend in vocabulary and creativity. Children who performed better on the WASI-
Vocabulary task performed better on fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT. While 
adults who performed better on the WASI-Vocabulary task had higher scores on flexibility and 
originality on the AUT.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Age         
2. BDS .51**        
3. DCCS .31** .39**       
4. DoG .02 -.09 -.05      
5. Mindset -.01 -.18 .09 .03     
6. WASI-Vocabulary .50** .57** .39** -.04 -.21    
7. Fluency Baseline .43** .40** .16 .01 -.08 .43**   
8. Flexibility Baseline .51** .47** .27* -.03 -.05 .57** .87**  
9. Originality Baseline .30** .12 .03 .13 .19 .24* .58** .54** 
Table 3A. Bivariate correlations for children BDS = Backward Digit Span (Working Memory), 
DCCS = Dimension Change Card Sort (Cognitive Flexibility), DoG = Delay of Gratification 
Task (Inhibition) 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Age         
2. BDS .26**        
3. DCCS -.05 .-.12       
4. DoG .01 -.05 -.21*      
5. Mindset -.01 -.08 .08 .04     
6. WASI-Vocabulary .10 .04 -.21* .23* -.07    
7. Fluency Baseline .02 -.02 -.13 .19 -.08 .19   
8. Flexibility Baseline -.09 -.01 -.21* .25* -.01 .24* .78**  
9. Originality Baseline -.01 .05 -.23* .14 .14 .25* .70** .73** 
Table 3B. Bivariate correlations for adults. BDS = Backward Digit Span (Working Memory), 
DCCS = Dimension Change Card Sort (Cognitive Flexibility), DoG = Delay of Gratification 
Task (Inhibition) 
Influence of Age on Baseline Divergent Thinking 
 
A one-way ANOVA was used to test the first hypothesis that a significant slump in 
divergent thinking creativity would occur in fourth-graders while first-graders and adults would 
have higher divergent thinking creativity scores. This hypothesis was not supported as there was 
no significant fourth-grade slump, but rather divergent thinking scores appeared to increase with 
age, see Figures 3A-C. There was a significant effect of age on fluency at baseline, F(2, 181) = 
15.33, p < .001, η2 = .15. Tukey’s post-hoc analyses revealed that fourth-graders showed better 
fluency than first-graders, p = .001 and adults showed better fluency than first-graders, p < .001, 
see Figure 3A. There was also a significant effect of age on flexibility at baseline, F(2, 181) = 
34.14, p < .001, η2 = .28. Again, Tukey’s post-hoc analyses revealed that fourth-graders 
performed better than first-graders, p < .001, and adults performed better than first-graders, p < 
.001. Adults also performed better than fourth-graders, p = .01, see Figure 3B.  Finally, a 
marginally significant effect of age was found on originality at baseline as well, F(2, 181), = 
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2.76, p = .07, η2 = .03. Originality at baseline appears to follow a u-shape pattern where fourth-
graders marginally perform better than first-graders, p = .06. Fourth-graders also appear to 
perform better than adults, though this effect is not significant, p = .19, see Figure 3C.  
 
 
 
Figure 3A. Age and Fluency. Mean fluency on AUT baseline for first-graders, fourth-graders and 
adults. **p<.01, ***p<.001.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3B. Age and Flexibility. Mean flexibility scores on the AUT Baseline for first-grade, 
fourth-grade and adult. **p<.01, ***p<.001.  
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Figure 3C. Age and Originality. Mean originality scores on AUT baseline for first-graders, 
fourth-graders and adults. Results for originality were not significantly different across age 
groups.  
Relative Contribution of Cognitive and Motivation Factors on Baseline Divergent Thinking 
 
To examine the relative influence of EF and mindset on baseline creativity scores I ran a 
separate multivariate GLM for children (first-graders and fourth-graders) and adults with 
Divergent Thinking (DT) scores for fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT entered as 
dependent variables and age (categorical for children, either first- or fourth-grade), the three EF 
variables (BDS, DCCS, and DoG task), mindset, and vocabulary as predictor variables1. 
                                            
 
 
 
1 Analyses were also run with children and adults in the same analysis by calculating z-scores on the raw EF scores 
to account for the different measures (i.e., z-scores calculated for children and adults). A multivariate GLM with 
fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT baseline as dependent variables and age, z-score for BDS, DCCS and 
DoG, vocabulary and mindset were entered as predictor variables. Interactions between age and EF, age and mindset 
and age and vocabulary were also explored. BDS was significantly related to DT, F(1,171) = 3.64, p = .01; Wilk's Λ 
= .93, partial η2 =.06, where there was a marginally significant effect demonstrating that those with better working 
memory had better originality scores, F(1,171) = 2.97, p = .09. Vocabulary also was significantly related to DT, 
F(1,171) = 3.66, p = .01; Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .01, where higher vocabulary related to higher fluency, 
F(1,171) = 4.36, p = .04, higher flexibility F(1, 171) = 8.36, p = .004, and higher originality, F(1, 171) = 8.76, p = 
.004. All other variables were not related to DT baseline scores and there were no significant age interactions, all 
F’s(1,171) < 3.34, p’s > .07, Wilk's Λ > .92, partial η2  > .01. Since patterns of results were similar when adults and 
children were in the same analysis and we did not find evidenced of a 4th grade slump—which is why adults were 
1
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Interactions between age and EF, age and mindset and age and vocabulary were also explored. 
For children, only BDS was significantly related to DT scores F(1, 73) = 2.88, p = .04 Wilk's Λ = 
.87, partial η2 = .13. Follow up analyses revealed a marginally significant effect of the BDS, 
with higher working memory performance on this task relating to greater originality in DT 
responses, F(1,73) = 2.70, p = .09. DT scores were not significantly related to DCCS (i.e., 
cognitive flexibility), F(1, 73) = 0.32, p = .82, Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .02, or DoG (i.e., 
inhibition) F(1, 73) = 0.10, p = .97, Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .01. Further, mindset was not 
related to DT scores, F(1, 73) = 0.06, p = .98, Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .01, and vocabulary 
was marginally related to DT in children, F(1, 73) = 2.39, p = .08, Wilk's Λ = .89, partial η2 = 
.11, where children who performed better on vocabulary had higher flexibility on the AUT, F(1, 
73) = 5.56, p = .02, and higher originality on the AUT, F(1, 73) = 4.61, p = .03. 
 For adults, none of the individual difference variables related to DT scores. For EF, there 
were no significant relationships between DT scores and either BDS, F(1, 97) = 1.70, p = .18, 
Wilk's Λ = .94, partial η2 = .06, DCCS, F(1, 97) = 0.86, p = .47, Wilk's Λ = .97, partial η2 = .03, 
or DoG, F(1, 97) = 1.37, p = .26, Wilk's Λ = .95, partial η2 = .05. Further, there was also no 
relationship between mindset and DT, F(1, 97) = 0.63, p = .60, Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02, or 
vocabulary and DT, F(1, 97) = .65, p = .59, Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02.  
 
 
                                            
 
 
 
included in the first place, I presented adults and children in separate analyses so that I could better examine how 
raw scores in the slightly different EF measures given at each age related to creativity for children and adults.   
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Contribution of Labeling and EF to Divergent Thinking  
 
  A multivariate general linear model with fluency, flexibility and originality for the AUT 
Label entered as dependent variables and age group (categorical: first-grade, fourth-grade and 
adult) and condition (ambiguous or non-ambiguous label) as predictors was conducted to test 
whether there was a relationship between labeling condition and DT. An age by condition 
interaction was also explored. There was a significant main effect of labeling, F(1, 180) = 
4.35, p = .006; Wilk's Λ = .93, partial η2 = .07, demonstrating an influence of labels on DT in the 
opposite direction than predicted. Specifically, those in the non-ambiguous condition had higher 
fluency generating significantly more ideas than those in the ambiguous condition F(1,180) = 
5.84, p = .02, see Figure 4. A main effect of age group was also found, F(1,180) = 4.74, p < .001, 
Wilk's Λ = .85, partial η2 = .08. Tukey’s post-hoc analysis demonstrated a significant difference 
between first- and fourth-graders and between first-graders and adults, p’s < .03, but no 
difference between fourth-graders and adults, p’s > .90 on fluency, flexibility and originality, 
again demonstrating a lack of a fourth-grade slump. There was no significant interaction between 
age and labeling condition on DT scores, F(1,180) = 1.23, p = .296, Wilk's Λ = .96, partial η2 = 
.02, suggesting that that fourth graders did not benefit more from the ambiguous label and 
instead all ages benefited from the non-ambiguous label equally.    
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Figure 4. Fluency and Labeling Condition. Those in the non-ambiguous condition generated 
more responses (higher fluency) on the AUT than those in the ambiguous condition. *p < .05.  
 
I ran two separate multivariate GLM’s, one for children and one for adults, to test 
whether higher EF would help DT scores particularly in the ambiguous condition2. For children, 
fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT Label were entered as dependent variables with 
age category (first-grade or fourth-grade), condition, and the three EF variables, BDS, DCCS, 
and DoG task as predictors. Two-way interactions of age by condition and EF by condition were 
explored along with three-way interactions between age, EF and condition. For children, main 
effects were not found for age, condition, DCCS or DoG task, all F’s(1,79) < 1.04, p’s > .38, 
Wilk's Λ > .89, partial η2  > .01. There was a marginal effect for BDS, F(1,79) = 2.52, p = .06, 
                                            
 
 
 
2 Analyses were also run using all age groups and z-scores for the EF variables as was done for baseline creativity 
scores. The results mirrored the ones found when examining children and adults separately with neither working 
memory, F (1,179) = .1.63, p = .18; Wilk's Λ = .97, partial η2 = .03, cognitive flexibility, F (1,179) = .29, p = .83; 
Wilk's Λ = .10, partial η2 = .01, nor inhibition, F (1,179) = .90, p = .44; Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02, were related 
to DT in this model. Interactions between labeling condition and age, and condition by EF were not significant.  
There were also no significant age interactions, all p’s > .17. Again, given the lack of age interactions I decided to 
run adults and children in separate analyses so that I could better examine how raw scores in the different EF 
measures given at each age related to creativity for children and adults.   
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ambiguous Non-Ambiguous
A
v
er
ag
e 
F
lu
en
cy
Labeling Condition
* 
41 
 
Wilk's Λ = .96, partial η2 = .11, where children with higher scores on the BDS (i.e., better 
working memory) had better originality on the AUT, F(1,79) = 5.48, p = .02, and marginally 
better flexibility on the AUT, F(1,79) = 3.66, p = .06.  An age by condition interaction was not 
significant, F(1,79) = .98, p = .76, Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02. Condition by any EF variable 
interactions were also not significant, all F’s(1,79) < 1.06, p’s > .37, Wilk's Λ > .95, partial η2  > 
.04. Three-way interactions between age, all three EF variables and labeling condition were also 
not significant, all F’s(1,79) < 1.67, p’s > .13, Wilk's Λ > .85, partial η2  > .02. 
In the GLM for adults, I entered fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT Label as 
dependent variables with condition, and the three EF variables, BDS, DCCS, and DoG task, as 
predictors. Two-way interactions of condition and EF variables were explored. Main effects were 
not found for condition, or for any of the EF variables, all F’s(1,97) < 1.03, p’s > .38, Wilk's Λ > 
.97, partial η2  > .001. Interactions between condition and all EF variables were not significant, 
all F’s(1,97) < 2.40, p’s > .19, Wilk's Λ > .98, partial η2  > .02. Three-way interactions between 
age, all three EF variables and labeling condition were also not significant, all F’s(1,79) < 1.92, 
p’s > .09, Wilk's Λ > .97, partial η2  > .02. 
Persistence, Mindset and Divergent Thinking  
 
 Difference scores were calculated for the dependent variable of fluency on the AUT after 
being asked to persist, where the actual total number of responses generated by the participant 
during their second attempt at answering was subtracted from the number of items the participant 
expected to generate. Higher scores indicated that a participant overvalued their persistence (i.e., 
expected to generate more responses than they actually did when given the opportunity to 
persist), lower scores indicate that they undervalued their persistence (i.e., expected to generate 
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fewer responses than they actually did) and a score of zero indicated that the participant correctly 
estimated how many responses they would generate when given more time. Only fluency was 
used to calculate this dependent variable since persistence relates more to the number of ideas 
one can generate than it does to either the number of categories (flexibility) or how unique their 
responses would be (originality). The difference score was entered as the dependent variable 
with age (categorical either first-grade, fourth-grade or adult), mindset and an age by mindset 
interaction entered as predictors in the model.  
 A univariate GLM was used to examine whether adults and children show different 
patterns in their value of persistence and whether individuals with a growth mindset would be 
less likely to undervalue their persistence. Difference scores for persistence were entered as the 
dependent variable with age category and mindset entered as independent variables. An age by 
mindset interaction was also explored. There was no main effect for age, F(2,172) = 1.50, p = 
.23, suggesting that there was no difference in how children and adults valued persistence in a 
divergent thinking task . There was also no main effect for mindset, F(1,172) = .59, p = .45, 
suggesting that there was no difference for those with a growth or fixed mindset on the value of 
persistence in a divergent thinking task. An age by mindset interaction was also not significant, 
F(2,172) = 2.08, p = .13, which also failed to provide evidence for differences in how children 
and adults with a growth mindset versus a fixed mindset value their persistence on a divergent 
thinking task. Since age was not a significant predictor of value of persistence, I conducted a one 
sample t-test to determine whether people across all age groups undervalued, overvalued, or 
correctly estimated their persistence on the AUT. Across all age groups, people tend to 
undervalue their persistence, t(181) = 10.78, p < .001. Specifically, people estimate on average 
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they will produce about one and a half more responses (M = 1.52, SD = 1.90) and actually 
produce approximately three more responses (M = 2.94, SD = 1.95) when given more time, see 
Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Persistence and Creativity. Mean scores for expected performance (i.e., number of 
items participants believed they would generate) compared to actual performance (i.e., number 
of items they actually generated when given more time). ***p < .001.  
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
 The current study aimed to confirm a significant slump in creativity around fourth-grade 
and examine whether EF, labeling and mindset contributed to creativity across the lifespan. A 
slump in creativity was not found, rather, divergent thinking creativity scores tended to increase 
from first-grade to adulthood. In the present study, EF was more strongly related to creativity for 
children than for adults. Better EF and vocabulary were related to higher creativity scores for 
children, and when considered together, working memory emerged as the strongest predictor of 
originality. This same trend did not occur for adults, where EF was not a significant predictor of 
creativity and though vocabulary was positively correlated with flexibility and originality in 
adults, it was not a successful concurrent predictor of creative ability when considered together 
with other factors. When examining whether using an ambiguous label would aid in creativity 
over using a non-ambiguous label, surprisingly the use of the non-ambiguous label was more 
beneficial to fluency for all ages. Finally, growth mindset did not lead to more divergent thinking 
creativity scores in either children or adults. All age groups undervalued their persistence on a 
divergent thinking creativity task and this was not related to their mindset. The results of this 
study demonstrate that creativity increases as individuals age and is influenced by the type of 
label used during a creative task (i.e., non-ambiguous label), persistence (i.e., although people 
tend to undervalue persistence in a creative task, persistence does generally lead to more creative 
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responses), and EF (i.e., working memory aids in better originality for children, but not for 
adults).  
Development of Creativity 
Contrary to prior reports speculating a slump in creativity in the fourth-grade (Torrance, 
1967; 1968), in the present study fluency and flexibility in creativity increased with age from 
first-grade to fourth-grade until adulthood. There are several possible reasons for these linear 
creativity increases with age. First, these findings are consistent with research showing that 
relative “slumps” and “peaks” in creativity show inconsistency across research as to what age 
they occur (Barbot, Lubart & Besancon, 2016; Charles & Runco, 2001; Kim, 2011). For 
example, Charles and Runco (2001) found a peak in creativity at fourth-grade rather than a 
slump, and Kim (2011) and Lau and Cheung (2010) did not find a fourth-grade slump, but rather 
slumps in sixth- or seventh-grade. Though the current study found a linear relationship 
demonstrating creativity improves with age, I only examined creativity in first-grade, fourth-
grade and adulthood, limiting the ability to detect slumps in creativity in other age groups. Thus, 
it is possible that a significant slump in creativity may exist at another age group (e.g., a slump 
existing in the sixth-grade, Kim, 2011).  
Second, the different tasks used in studies about the development of creativity may 
explain the variations in the timing of slumps (Barbot, Lubart & Besancon, 2016). Though I used 
the most widely used measure of creativity in the literature, the AUT (a portion of the Torrance 
Test of Creative Thinking which were used to establish the fourth-grade slump; Torrance, 1968), 
studies examining the development of creativity have utilized other measures. For example, 
Claxton, Pannels and Rhoads (2005) who found a slight increase in DT scores from fourth- to 
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ninth- grade utilized the Creativity Assessment Packet for measures of divergent thinking and 
divergent feeling; a peak in fourth-grade found by Charles and Runco (2001) used the two 
instances task where participants were asked to name instances of round things and things that 
make noise; and Kim (2011) used the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking to find a slump in 
sixth-grade. Several studies that have administered multiple creativity tasks have outlined 
different developmental trajectories for each task (Barbot, Lubart & Besancon, 2016; Claxton et 
al., 2005; Torrance, 1968), demonstrating that the specific task used may measure creative 
potential in slightly different ways.  
These differences between tasks are likely due to each task targeting a specific facet of 
creativity (i.e., divergent thinking: many solutions to a single problem such as the uses for a 
brick, or convergent thinking: one solution to a problem such as finding a way to make a 
pendulum swing using only one item) while creativity is more than just the sum of its parts and 
needs to be considered as a whole where convergent and divergent thinking work together .  My 
finding of a linear increase in creativity when using the AUT adds to the developmental 
creativity literature and suggests that creativity might increase as people age rather than be 
marked by specific slumps throughout development.  However, the fact that patterns of creativity 
are so variable and depend heavily on the type of task used suggests that more work is needed in 
this area. Using different measures of creativity that include both divergent and convergent 
thinking within creativity to assess its development could influence the variations in timings for 
slumps as the deficits found may be related to each specific task more than to age. Utilizing 
multiple measures of creativity using different facets of creativity would allow research on its 
development to determine whether trends in development (i.e, slumps in creativity) are relegated 
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to individual facets of creativity and help parse out the trajectory of its development more 
completely.  
Contribution of EF and Vocabulary to Divergent Thinking  
 
Another novel finding in this study was related to a possible differential relationship 
between EF and creativity in children and adults. Better working memory was associated with 
better fluency and flexibility on the AUT in children and better cognitive flexibility was 
associated with better flexibility on the AUT in children. When examined together, working 
memory was shown to be the strongest predictor of performance on the AUT with better working 
memory leading to higher scores for originality on the AUT at baseline and marginally higher 
scores for originality and flexibility during the labeling condition. These results support previous 
research with adults where both cognitive flexibility (Beaty, Kennett, Christensen, Rosenberg, 
Benedek, Chen, et al., 2018; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) and working memory (Asiz-Zadeh, 
Liew, & Dandekar, 2013) are shown to aid in creativity. Better cognitive flexibility is thought to 
contribute to creativity by allowing individuals to more easily switch between different 
techniques that may or may not be working during a problem-solving task (Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010). The current research extends this finding to children showing that children who 
have higher cognitive flexibility perform better on flexibility on the AUT perhaps due to a 
greater ability to switch between their ideas during the divergent thinking task. Working 
memory, however, appeared to be the strongest predictor of performance on the AUT for 
children. This may be due to children having similar ability to adults in being able to mentally 
manipulate objects and potential uses for that object necessary for the task (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & 
Dandekar, 2013).  
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However, for adults, EF was not related to divergent thinking creativity either at baseline 
or in any labeling condition. These results also appear to be in contrast to previous literature 
demonstrating a link between EF and creativity in adults where higher cognitive flexibility was 
found among creative individuals (Beaty, Kennett, Christensen, Rosenberg, Benedek, Chen, et 
al., 2018; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010), a link between divergent thinking and working memory 
locations was found in the prefrontal cortex (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013) and lower 
inhibition among was found creative individuals (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; White & 
Shah, 2006). The lack of a EF-creativity link in adults could be more methodological in the 
present study. The tasks used to measure EF in adults and in children in the current study were 
designed to be as comparable as possible, but also slightly different from one another to make 
the tasks more age appropriate (e.g., the delay of gratification task to assess inhibition using 
stickers, pennies and erasers for children and using a hypothetical scenario about money for 
adults). This may have resulted in EF measures that were too simplistic for our adult sample. In 
current adult EF work the ecological validity of EF tests has been called into question. In one 
study by Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe and Burr (2006), current most utilized EF tests such as 
the Stroop Test and Wisconsin Card Sorting Task only accounted for 18-20 percent of the 
variance in everyday executive functioning abilities. When environmental factors were added 
(e.g., environmental cognitive load) more of the variance was accounted for suggesting that there 
may be other influences on EF ability than the EF tasks can account for alone. Therefore, it is 
possible that the EF tests for adults in the current study were not inclusive enough to capture 
everyday EF ability in adults leading to the insignificant results. 
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Even with attempts to make these tasks more age appropriate, adults in the current study 
appeared to reach ceiling on the cognitive flexibility task (e.g., correctly answering all 24 items 
on the switch trials of the DCCS) even with using a measure of the DCCS designed for adults. 
Though our data was log transformed to account for these ceiling effects it may have contributed 
to the differences we see in children and adults. Using reaction times or a measure of cognitive 
flexibility that has been shown to not produce high ceiling effects would be beneficial in 
affirming these results.  
The current study also examined how vocabulary was related to divergent thinking since 
the AUT is inherently a verbal task. Better vocabulary ability was positively related to fluency, 
flexibility and originality at baseline for children and to flexibility and originality at baseline for 
adults. These findings are in support of previous research that has found using mnemonics in an 
English as Second Language class has helped increase students’ vocabulary and in turn their 
creativity on writing assignments (Pillai, 2017). The AUT requires that people think about 
specific uses for an object. Having a better vocabulary relates to this ability in that both children 
and adults can find a wider variety of uses for an object (e.g., higher flexibility) when they have 
a greater understanding of different types of words and concepts to begin with (e.g., higher 
vocabulary). Indeed, higher vocabulary has been linked with better strategies used during 
convergent problem-solving tasks (Blanchard-Fields, Chen, & Norris, 1997). The current results 
add to the literature by demonstrating that this link between higher vocabulary and better 
problem-solving extends into divergent problem-solving tasks such as the AUT for creativity 
measurement.  
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Contribution of Labeling to Divergent Thinking  
 
Using labels in a functional fixedness task has been shown to influence performance on a 
divergent thinking creativity task (Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966). The current study 
hypothesized that using an ambiguous label would further help individuals on a divergent 
thinking creativity task as opposed to using a non-ambiguous label because an ambiguous label 
would not anchor participants into a functional fixedness problem by responding with only the 
most common uses for an object (e.g., building a house for the word “brick”). However, using an 
ambiguous label for an object did not help participants think more creatively about uses for that 
object. In fact, using a non-ambiguous label actually helped participants generate more creative 
uses for an item. It is possible that people of all ages needed to be grounded in some concept of 
what an object is in order to determine what it might be useful for. When examining referential 
communication in children, Glucksberg, Krauss and Weisberg (1966) used a novel nomenclature 
for novel objects to determine whether 3-5- year old children could form representations of novel 
words for objects to communicate with others. A child and an experimenter were placed together 
to construct a tower of blocks with unfamiliar objects on them. The adult had to communicate 
with the child using novel nomenclature for these novel objects so that the child could construct 
an identical tower of blocks. In practice trials, children were able to represent the blocks and 
share nomenclature for familiar objects of animal faces on the blocks. However, during the 
testing phase with novel objects on the blocks, children performed much worse. The study found 
that unlike adults, children were unable to form solid representations of the shared nomenclature 
for the novel objects. This might suggest that using ambiguous labels of objects, similar to using 
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novel nomenclature for objects, may be difficult for young children without some form of 
reference, or non-ambiguous label, to help guide them.  
Related, work has found that ill-formed representations hinder problem-solving 
performance in preschoolers. For example, Miller, Marcovitch, Boseovski and Lewkowicz 
(2015) showed that when you provide preschool children with an unfamiliar label (e.g., an 
ordinal label of first, second and third, before they know what those concepts mean) it actually 
hinders their performance in a spatial search task. The authors suggest the decrease in 
performance may be due to the fact that they are establishing an ill-formed representation which 
hurts their performance when reflected on to guide behavior. Results from the current study may 
extend these findings and suggest that these types of ill-formed representations likely impact 
problem-solving in a creative divergent thinking task because children have difficulty forming a 
representation of the object presented to them when given an ambiguous label that does not 
ground the object in something familiar.  
The fact that people perform better with a concrete non-ambiguous label aligns with other 
work demonstrating a benefit of concrete labels in convergent tasks as well. When both children 
and adults use verbal labels to represent what to do in a specific task, they can overcome 
difficulties on that task (Muller, Zelazo, Hood, Leone & Rohrer, 2004). For example, using a 
verbal label helps adults in the classic Stroop test where participants must name the color of ink 
with mismatching or matching color words (MacLeod, 1991). Stating the condition out loud 
(e.g., naming the color of the ink) before responding significantly improved performance for 
adults. Similarly, 3-year old children who used a verbal label before of task condition before 
responding to a task with a congruent trial (e.g., choosing two cards with the same object on 
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them) and an incongruent trial (e.g., selecting two cards with different objects on them) 
significantly improved their ability to select the correct situation compared to 3-year old children 
who did not verbally label the situation before making a selection (Muller, Zelazo, Hood, Leone 
& Rohrer, 2004).  Perhaps, using a non-ambiguous label aids in object representation similar to 
how a verbal label aids in task representation (MacLeod, 1991; Muller, Zelazo, Hood, Leone & 
Rohrer, 2004). That is for both children and adults using a familiar word label (non-ambiguous 
label) helps to form a representation of the object allowing for more creative responses for the 
object on the AUT. However, in the present study it is not clear whether the ambiguous label is 
hurting performance, the concrete label is helping performance, or whether there is a little bit of 
both occurring. Future studies should include a condition without labels to better understand how 
language influences our thinking during divergent thinking creativity tasks.  
Estimation of Persistence on Divergent Thinking Task  
 
Persistence allows individuals to push through difficult tasks and thinking creatively is 
often difficult and time consuming. Thus, having a strong belief that persistence will help you 
solve creativity tasks is important. However, Lucas and Nordgren (2015) found that adults 
undervalued persistence in a creativity task even though persisting often led to more ideas and 
more creative ideas. The current study extended these findings to children demonstrating that as 
young as first-grade, individuals will begin to undervalue persistence in a creative task. This 
appears in contrast to past research showing that children tend to overestimate their abilities 
(Butler, 1990). However, past research indicates that children overestimate their abilities when 
comparing themselves to others and the current study examines estimation of persistence only in 
relation to oneself. Although there are several possibilities for why children estimate their 
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abilities differently when comparing themselves to others and to themselves, the Social 
Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT; Brown, Tramayne, Hoxha, Telander & Fan, 2008; Lent, Brown 
& Hackett, 1994) may shed light on why people of all ages are underestimating their level of 
persistence on creativity tasks. In this theory, students who perform well academically do so 
based on their ability to form concrete goals based on expectations of an outcome and self-
efficacy beliefs that are derived from past performance (e.g., high school GPA) and general 
cognitive ability (e.g., SAT or ACT scores). Applied to creativity, it is possible that people are 
experiencing poor self-efficacy beliefs and deriving poor outcome expectations (i.e., 
underestimating their persistence on a creative task) due to prior performance on creative tasks 
(e.g., having to write a story in class). If people are exposed to creative tasks that do not match 
their creative ability, such as being forced to write a story in class when their creative ability is 
more apt for taking photographs, they may develop a sense of poor self-efficacy beliefs that lead 
them to lower estimation of how much persistence will help.  
I believe this mismatch between creative tasks and creative ability starts young when 
children are exposed to creative tasks in school and this experience continues throughout the 
lifespan as shown in the results of the current study. For example, research on different 
pedagogical modalities focusing on either alternative pedagogy that focuses on things such as 
creativity (e.g., Montessori schools) or more traditional education techniques found in a typical 
public school have shown repeatedly that when focused on creative pedagogy children’s creative 
achievement is improved (Avanzini & Ferrero, 1967; Besancon & Lubart, 2008; Frankieweicz, 
1984) demonstrating that if children find a match to their creative potential they may increase 
their creative ability. Though this research only demonstrates creative ability being improved and 
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not creative self-concept or persistence in creativity, if we examined persistence in creative tasks 
in an alternative pedagogical environment like a Montessori school versus a more traditional 
pedagogical environment differences might emerge.  
Mindset and Divergent Thinking  
 
When examining how motivational factors such as mindset, related to divergent thinking 
it was found that mindset was not related to divergent thinking creativity in either adults or 
children nor was it related to persistence. These results are surprising, as a growth mindset has 
been shown to benefit creativity and positively influence creative self-concepts (Bowden & 
Beeman, 1998; Karwowski, 2014; O’Neill, 2011). One possibility for the null relationship 
between mindset and divergent thinking may relate to the measure of mindset in the present 
study. The mindset questionnaire I used was a short eight-item questionnaire generally used to 
determine a general growth or fixed mindset that can be used for determining mindset related to 
anything, such as mindset about math or about IQ or about life in general (Dweck, 2006). 
Though using a questionnaire that could capture mindset in a wider variety of areas was the 
initial draw of using the mindset questionnaire, it is possible that using a different questionnaire 
that was longer and more appropriate for mindset more specifically related to creativity could 
have yielded different results. Specifically, researchers have typically studied growth and fixed 
mindsets as a singular term with the two operating at dual ends of a continuum (O’Connor, 
Nemeth & Akutsu, 2013). However, Karwowski (2014) used factor analysis and demonstrated 
people may hold different mindsets at the same time for different things. For example, a person 
may hold a fixed mindset related to solving math problems and a growth mindset related to 
solving divergent thinking creativity problems. Our measure treated mindset as a global ability, 
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where someone held either a growth or fixed mindset that would be applied to every domain. 
Utilizing a mindset measure specific to divergent thinking in future studies would more 
accurately demonstrate whether a growth mindset is related to divergent thinking creativity by 
capturing how people view their mindset related specifically to creativity.   
Another issue with the mindset questionnaire employed in the present study was its fairly 
low internal reliability scores. Though this scale has been used in previous studies and found to 
have higher reliability than in the current study (Dweck, 2006), this study may have found lower 
internal reliability due to combining children and adults in the same study. Dweck (2006) 
utilized this questionnaire in multiple studies, but all were conducted with adults finding higher 
internal reliability. When examining the internal reliability of the scale in the current sample with 
only adults it was found to be higher (i.e., α = .67 as opposed to .56 when children and adults 
were included together) and reliability was relatively lower for children (i.e., α = .47). This 
demonstrates that in our sample the lower reliability score for children may have caused the 
reliability for the mindset questionnaire to be lower than in previous studies limiting our 
interpretations of its results. This lower reliability for children may be due to children as young 
as first- or fourth-grade may not fully comprehend what the measure is trying to capture. When 
utilizing a different mindset measure that examines creativity mindset specifically as mentioned 
above, it will be important to use such a measure that is also specifically designed for children to 
ensure that all children are understanding the nature of the questions.   
Conclusion 
 
The current study contributes our understanding of creativity development in several 
important ways. First, it reiterates the unpredictability of the development of creativity showing a 
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linear growth in creative ability from first-grade to adulthood. Second, it shows that cognitive 
factors like EF differentially contribute to creativity depending on age. For children in first- and 
fourth-grade, working memory played a significant role in originality of creative ideas. For 
adults, EF did not play a role in creative ability. Third, it demonstrates that non-ambiguous labels 
are more effective than ambiguous labels in aiding creative output. Fourth, personality factors 
such as mindset may not play a role in creativity. Lastly, all age groups tend to undervalue 
persisting through creative tasks. Though this study makes important contributions to the field, 
there are some limitations that need to be addressed. First, the study only used one divergent 
thinking creativity task, the AUT. Though the AUT is the most widely used divergent thinking 
creativity task, it is possible that task characteristics may have contributed to some of our null 
findings and using at least one other task could have addressed this. Second, it was found that 
non-ambiguous labels aided in creativity more than did ambiguous labels, but more research is 
needed to uncover why this phenomenon occurs. Third, our low internal reliability and 
continuous measure for mindset may have limited the observance of a relationship between 
mindset and creativity. Using a measure related to creative mindsets would help future studies 
better parse out this relationship or demonstrate that indeed no relationship exists as was found in 
this study. Lastly, though I examined how people evaluated persisting in a creative task, I did not 
examine possible reasons for this undervaluation. Future studies should examine the components 
of the SCCT in terms of creativity to determine how self-efficacy beliefs and ideas about past 
performance/ability may influence people’s perceptions on whether persisting through a difficult 
creative task can be beneficial. Taken together, the results of this study demonstrate the 
complexity of creativity and its development from first-grade to adulthood.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Brick Cardboard 
Box 
Shoe Chair Dinosaur/ 
Pelganum 
Car/ 
Bup 
Bubble-
wand/ 
Sharitnum 
Light-
bulb/ 
Blicket 
1. Animal 
2. Arts &   
Crafts 
3. Atop 
4. Break 
5. Build 
6. Burn 
7. Bury 
8. Cover 
9. Exercis
e 
10. Experi
ment 
11. Garden 
12. Gift 
13. Hang 
14. Hold 
15. Noise 
16. Place 
17. Play 
18. Present
ation 
19. Prop 
20. Protecti
on 
21. Senses 
22. Sit 
23. Stack 
24. Stand 
25. Storage 
26. Throw 
27. Tool 
28. Usage 
29. Weapo
n 
30. Wear 
31. Weight 
1. Arts & 
Crafts 
2. Break 
3. Build 
4. Burn 
5. Bury 
6. Cover 
7. Descripti
on 
8. Experime
nt 
9. Gift 
10. Hang 
11. Hide 
12. Hold 
13. Make 
14. Place 
15. Play 
16. Presentat
ion 
17. Prop 
18. Protectio
n 
19. Recycle 
20. Senses 
21. Shelter 
22. Shipping 
23. Sit 
24. Stack 
25. Stand 
26. Storage 
27. Throw 
28. Tool 
29. Transpor
tation 
30. Usage 
31. Weapon 
32. Wear 
33. Weight 
1. Arts & 
Crafts 
2. Atop 
3. Break 
4. Build 
5. Burn 
6. Collect 
7. Cover 
8. Damag
e 
9. Descri
ption 
10. Experi
ment 
11. Fashio
n 
12. Garde
n 
13. Gift 
14. Hang 
15. Hide 
16. Hold 
17. Move
ment 
18. Noise 
19. Play 
20. Prop 
21. Protect
ion 
22. Recycl
e 
23. Senses 
24. Sit 
25. Stack 
26. Storag
e 
27. Tie 
28. Throw 
29. Tool 
30. Usage 
31. Weapo
n 
32. Wear 
1. Action 
2. Arts & 
Crafts 
3. Atop 
4. Break 
5. Build 
6. Burn 
7. Carry 
8. Climb 
9. Descrip
tion 
10. Fold 
11. Gift 
12. Hang 
13. Hide 
14. Movem
ent 
15. Place 
16. Play 
17. Present
ation 
18. Protecti
on 
19. Recycle 
20. Sit 
21. Stack 
22. Stool 
23. Throw 
24. Tool 
25. Usage 
26. Weapo
n 
27. Wear 
28. Weight 
1. Arts & 
Crafts 
2. Atop 
3. Break 
4. Build 
5. Burn 
6. Bury 
7. Carry 
8. Descrip
tion 
9. Experi
ment 
10. Gift 
11. Hang 
12. Hold 
13. Manipu
late 
14. Movem
ent 
15. Noise 
16. Place 
17. Play 
18. Prop 
19. Present
ation 
20. Protecti
on 
21. Senses 
22. Stack 
23. Stool 
24. Throw 
25. Tool 
26. Trash 
27. Usage 
28. Weapo
n 
29. Wear 
30. Weight 
1. Arts & 
Crafts 
2. Atop 
3. Break 
4. Build 
5. Burn 
6. Descrip
tion 
7. Experi
ment 
8. Gift 
9. Hang 
10. Hold 
11. Movem
ent 
12. Noise 
13. Place 
14. Play 
15. Present
ation 
16. Prop 
17. Protecti
on 
18. Senses 
19. Sit 
20. Stack 
21. Stand 
22. Throw 
23. Tool 
24. Transpo
rt 
25. Trash 
26. Usage 
27. Weapo
n 
28. Wear 
29. Weight 
1. Arts & 
Crafts 
2. Atop 
3. Break 
4. Build 
5. Burn 
6. Descri
ption 
7. Experi
ment 
8. Gift 
9. Hang 
10. Hide 
11. Hold 
12. Manip
ulate 
13. Move
ment 
14. Noise 
15. Place 
16. Play 
17. Poke 
18. Prop 
19. Recycl
e 
20. Scoop 
21. Senses 
22. Sit 
23. Stand 
24. Throw 
25. Tool 
26. Trash 
27. Usage 
28. Weapo
n 
29. Wear 
30. Weigh
t 
1. Arts & 
Crafts 
2. Atop 
3. Blow 
4. Break 
5. Build 
6. Burn 
7. Cover 
8. Descri
ption 
9. Experi
ment 
10. Fill 
11. Gift 
12. Hang 
13. Hide 
14. Hit 
15. Hold 
16. Idea 
17. Kitche
n 
18. Light 
19. Move
ment 
20. Noise 
21. Place 
22. Play 
23. Poke 
24. Prop 
25. Protec
tion 
26. Recycl
e 
27. Senses 
28. Sit 
29. Stand 
30. Throw 
31. Tool 
32. Trash 
33. Usage 
34. Weapo
n 
35. Wear 
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33. Weight 36. Weigh
t 
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